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A BRIDLE, A PROD, AND A BIG STICK:  AN 
EVALUATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, AND THE 
ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE AS METHODS 
FOR CONTROLLING CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR 
ADAM J. SULKOWSKI† & KENT GREENFIELD†† 
“Great corporations exist only because they are created and 
safeguarded by our institutions; and it is therefore our right and 
our duty to see that they work in harmony with these 
institutions.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article evaluates recently applied methods of 
influencing corporate behavior and recommends that a dormant 
legal doctrine be revitalized and added to the “tool box” of 
activists and concerned shareholders.  This study focuses on 
efforts to remedy and prevent employment discrimination and 
draws upon data from recent cases.2  The lessons derived from 
this analysis, however, may be applied in other contexts, 
including efforts to improve the conduct of American corporations 
with regard to labor relations, environmental protection, and 
human rights in the developing world. 
The methods of influencing corporate behavior that will be 
evaluated include class action lawsuits and shareholder 
proposals to amend corporate policy.3  In both contexts, there are 
procedural hurdles to achieving success.  Even when success is 
achieved, there are limits to the actual changes in organizational 
behavior that result. 
There is a third means for influencing corporate behavior, 
often ignored, that does not involve the same theoretical or 
structural limitations.  The ultra vires doctrine historically 
allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company from engaging 
in an activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate 
charter.  While the doctrine was almost done away with during 
the 1900s inasmuch as companies are now free to alter their field 
of business as they wish, a narrow slice of this doctrine remains.4  
Namely, forty-seven states require corporate charters to limit a 
corporation to “lawful activities,” and forty-nine states have 
statutes empowering the state to enjoin or dissolve the 
corporation for illegal acts.5 
Therefore, shareholders still have the power to sue a 
 
2 See discussion infra Part I. 
3 See discussion infra Parts I.C, II.C. 
4 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
5 See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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company to prevent the violation of laws.  In the context of a 
company such as Wal-Mart, a well-documented pattern of 
widespread illegal gender discrimination could therefore be 
grounds for a shareholder to bring an ultra vires lawsuit.6  
Unlike a shareholder proposal, the available remedies could 
include a court order to cease the activity and to adopt a detailed 
monitoring, training, and compliance plan.  Unlike a class action, 
the high hurdles of certifying the plaintiffs as class 
representatives would not exist.  Nor would there be the same 
mix of practical concerns that contribute to class action attorneys 
emphasizing monetary rewards over long-term, disciplined 
equitable relief that is actually geared to altering company 
practices in the future.7 
The only limitation on using the ultra vires doctrine is that 
there must be evidence that a company is in violation of an 
actual law in a jurisdiction where it operates.8  In those contexts, 
ultra vires can effectively enable a form of a shareholder 
enforcement suit to ensure compliance with the federal laws of 
the United States, the laws of individual states, the statutes of 
foreign nations, or even international human rights laws.9 
While an ultra vires suit could also be initiated by a state 
attorney general, this Article focuses upon the use of the ultra 
vires doctrine by shareholder activists.  Institutional investors 
and shareholder groups have already sacrificed large amounts of 
resources over the past decade in their efforts to improve 
corporate conduct.10  These groups could use the ultra vires 
doctrine to achieve more tangible results with a smaller 
expenditure of resources. 
I.  CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS:  A BRIDLE 
A.  Reasons for Pursuing a Class Action Lawsuit 
Pursuing an employment discrimination lawsuit as a class 
action—that is, using a single suit to provide redress for an 
entire group of harmed people instead of each person suing 
individually—is desirable for several reasons.  One practical 
 
6 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
7 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
8 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
9 See discussion infra Parts III.B, III.D. 
10 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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reason is that lawyers who invest extensive resources on a 
contingency basis often need a larger incentive to accept a case 
than the incentive that a settlement or ruling on one individual 
plaintiff’s case would be.  Second, certification of a case as a class 
action drastically increases the chances that an employer will 
settle because it raises the stakes in terms of potential bad 
publicity and financial loss if the case goes to trial.  Third, in 
addition to monetary awards and punitive damages, an equitable 
remedy may be possible; for example, the plaintiffs could ask for 
a court-ordered regimen of monitoring and non-discrimination 
compliance training to affect future hiring, compensation, and 
promotion decisions.  In that sense, if equitable remedies are 
sought by plaintiffs and awarded by a court or consented to in a 
settlement agreement, a class action can be a bridle with which 
to lead a corporation in a certain direction.  As described infra, 
however, the use of equitable remedies in class action lawsuits 
has been in decline for over a decade.11 
B.  Obstacles to Winning a Class Action Lawsuit 
The first potential impediment to getting a class action 
certified is the employment agreement between a company and 
its employees.  A clause requiring arbitration of disputes with all 
employees will make a lawsuit against the employer nearly 
impossible.12  In that event, each dispute will be handled 
individually by an arbitrator.13  Under such circumstances, as 
 
11 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
12 See Class Consciousness-Raising, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 20, 
2004, at B1 (providing an edited transcript of a panel discussion led by Charles A. 
Shanor of Emory University Law School and including “R. Lawrence Ashe Jr. of 
Ashe, Rafuse & Hill; Harlan S. Miller III of Miller Billips & Ates; Joshua F. Thorpe 
of Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore; and C. Geoffrey Weirich of Paul, Hastings, 
Janofsky & Walker”). Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow and 
very difficult to obtain. See Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat Without 
a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA 
L. REV. 1337, 1347–49 (2002) (describing the limitations on judicial action in 
arbitration awards under federal and state law); see also Michael H. LeRoy & Peter 
Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice: Arbitration Agreements That Expand Court 
Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 861, 871–73 (2004) (detailing 
the narrow criteria for judicial review of arbitration decisions under federal law). 
13 Class arbitrations are possible but only if several requirements are met. 
First, the employment agreement must not preclude a class arbitration, and even if 
it does, as of 2005, the current policy of the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) is first to seek court guidance before allowing a class arbitration to proceed. 
A class arbitration may still not offer all the benefits that a plaintiff may desire from 
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compared to a class action suit, the deterrent impact of a massive 
financial award, the public-relations leverage that a plaintiff 
class enjoys during the course of a high-stakes lawsuit, and the 
possible equitable relief of court-ordered change in corporate 
policy will not be available. 
The Supreme Court in 197714 and 198215 decided that, even 
though race- and gender-discrimination lawsuits under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act are inherently class based, these cases 
must still meet the class certification requirements of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  That is, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys must establish that the lawsuit will adequately 
represent the interests of all the parties that it claims to 
represent.16  The guidelines for ensuring the adequacy of 
representation are surprisingly imprecise,17 but the Supreme 
Court, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,18 recently stressed 
the need for rigorous analysis on the part of certifying courts to 
determine whether the class and representative plaintiffs 
experienced the same harm and share the same interests.19  In 
this same case, the Supreme Court stressed the need to evaluate 
the competency of the attorneys involved in the lawsuit and 
whether any attorney is compromised by a conflict, interrelation, 
or alignment of interests.20 
The ease of class certification thus frequently turns on the 
 
a lawsuit. For the most currently available information on the policies of the AAA, 
see AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AAA CLASS ARBITRATION POLICY (2005), available at 
http://www.adr.org/ClassArbitrationPolicy. 
14 See E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 405–06 
(1977) (“We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are 
often by their very nature class suits . . . . But careful attention to the requirements 
of Fed. Rule Civ Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable.”). 
15 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156–57 (1982) (holding 
that litigants pursuing a class action under Title VII must meet the Rule 23(a) 
requirements). 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
17 For a thorough review of the jurisprudence governing adequacy of 
representation, including the lack of substantive guidelines in the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003), see generally Debra Lyn 
Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring More Than Merely “Adequate” 
Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927 (2004). 
18 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
19 See id. at 625–27 (stating the need for careful evaluation of Rule 23’s 
requirements in certifying a class that represents the interests of all potential 
members). 
20 See id. at 626 n.20 (discussing the importance of evaluating the adequacy-of-
representation requirement along with the other requirements of Rule 23). 
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nature of evidence and the contours of the underlying claim, and 
even at the federal appellate level courts disagree as to the 
threshold level of evidence necessary to allow a class action case 
to go forward.21  Certification is easiest if there is a company rule, 
a widespread practice, a test with a disparate impact, or a stated 
decision at the top of a management hierarchy that fosters 
discrimination.22  A more difficult situation for establishing a 
class action is when the company claims to have delegated 
personnel decisions to the subjective discretion of managers at 
the local level.  In these cases, an expert witness is needed to 
aggregate information to demonstrate convincingly that 
discrimination is likely occurring.23  While this is a difficult 
hurdle to overcome, it is not impossible as demonstrated by 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,24 in which a class of up to 1.6 
million female Wal-Mart workers was certified.25  This may 
qualify as the largest class action gender-discrimination suit in 
U.S. history.26  This kind of aggregation of proof from the local 
level is possible when a company’s hourly employees are, for 
example, 65% female but store managers at the same company 
are 14% female.27 
Despite the occasional success, recent class action 
developments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
tended to favor corporate defendants.28  For example, Rule 23(f) 
 
21 Compare Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410–11, 414–16 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (finding certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) impermissible if class 
members seek compensatory or punitive damages as the predominant—as opposed 
to incidental—form of relief), with Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 
F.3d 147, 162–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting Allison’s incidental damages standard and 
adopting an “ad hoc approach” to class certification treatment under Rule 23(b)(2) 
which allows the district court discretion to certify a class even if compensatory or 
punitive damages are the predominant relief sought). 
22 See Class Consciousness-Raising, supra note 12, at B1. 
23 See id. 
24 222 F.R.D. 137, 145, 150, 160 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
25 See Constance L. Hays, The Wal-Mart Culture Pulls In 2 Directions, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., July 1, 2004, at 1R. 
26 Compliance, Diversity Focus at Wal-Mart Annual, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, 
June 7, 2004. 
27 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146, 161 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
see also Class Consciousness-Raising, supra note 12, at B1 (stating that more than 
fifty percent of lower-level store employees were females but only a small percentage 
of store managers and assistant managers were female). 
28 See Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, Mapping the New Class Action 
Frontier—A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act and Amended Federal Rule 23, 
59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 11, 13 (2005) (quoting President Bush as stating that 
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was added in 2003 to allow for the immediate appeal of a class 
action certification to a circuit court.29  Plaintiff’s counsel in the 
context of class actions must also consider which venue will be 
most favorable to them.  Certain courts, such as the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, are generally 
not as favorable to plaintiffs in large lawsuits as is the Ninth 
Circuit.30 
If both sides of a class action discrimination lawsuit want to 
settle the case early in the process, there is one last impediment.  
As of 1997, with the Amchem decision, the Supreme Court 
established that almost all of the class certification requirements 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be met before a 
class-wide settlement will be allowed.31 
C.  Limitations of Class Action Lawsuits to Alter Corporate 
Behavior 
A recent empirical study found that class actions are actually 
ineffective in significantly compensating plaintiffs, in affecting 
share price, or in bringing about lasting change.32  First, during 
the past decade, even cases with large settlements only created 
an average of approximately $10,000 of benefits per class 
member, which is below what one would expect in a typical 
individual suit.33  For example, discrimination settlements under 
the auspices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
in 1995 averaged $35,000, while the mean trial recovery obtained 
by private plaintiffs was $100,000.34 
Second, the impact of class action lawsuits on share price, 
both at the time of filing and at the time of settlement, is lower 
than what one might expect.  A systematic study of thirty-three 
class action awards and twenty-six settlements revealed no 
 
reforms to the Rules “will keep out-of-state businesses, workers, and shareholders 
from being dragged before unfriendly, local juries, or forced into unfair settlement”). 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
30 See Class Consciousness-Raising, supra note 12, at B1 (comparing the 
conservative trend of the Eleventh Circuit with the more liberal and plaintiff-
favorable Ninth Circuit). 
31 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). 
32 See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action 
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1250–
51 (2003). 
33 See id. at 1250. 
34 Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of 
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1435 (1998). 
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statistically relevant impact on share price at either the time of 
filing or at the time of settlement.35  Even in cases of large 
settlements, such as the $192.5 million settlement involving 
Coca-Cola in 2000, the settlement had little effect on share 
price.36  The Coca-Cola settlement amounted to roughly 0.15% of 
the firm’s market capitalization,37 contributing to a decrease of 
about six cents from the sixty dollars share price at the time of 
settlement.38 
Prior to 1991, lawyers and courts emphasized remedial relief 
that altered policy, required hiring preferences for former 
victims, and set out goals and timetables.39  In 1991, Title VII 
was revised to provide punitive damages,40 and since then, 
monetary relief has been the “core of the remedial package.”41  
“[T]here is little attempt to remedy past discrimination by other 
methods.”42  In three of the most highly visible cases—Texaco’s 
$176 million settlement, Coca-Cola’s $192 million settlement, 
and Home Depot’s $104 million settlement—not a single consent 
decree required a change in employment practices.43 
Observers have suggested that the focus of the plaintiffs and 
the courts upon rewarding monetary compensation instead of 
ensuring change represents a shift toward handling 
discrimination as a transaction or a cost of doing business.44  In 
cases where a consent decree or court order results in a 
prescribed change of policy, the monitoring has been left to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and diversity task forces, neither of which 
 
35 See Selmi, supra note 32, at 1257–68. 
36 See id. at 1250 n.7. 
37 See id. at 1250. 
38 See id. at 1250 n.7. See also Davan Maharaj, Coca-Cola To Settle Racial Bias 
Lawsuit; Workplace: Soft Drink Giant Agrees To Pay $192.5 Million Over Allegations 
It Treated Blacks Unfairly, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at A1 (stating that the market 
had incorporated the possibility of Coca-Cola’s settlement into its stock price months 
before the terms of the settlement were publicly announced). 
39 See, e.g., Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1123–24 
(2d Cir. 1983) (providing race-conscious promotional relief); Officers for Justice v. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 635–36 (9th Cir. 1982) (validating promotional 
goals and timetables); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (requiring job performance goals). 
40 B. Ford Robertson, Commissioner v. Schleier: The Excludability of ADEA 
Awards Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 31 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 557, 562 (1996). 
41 Selmi, supra note 32, at 1299. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. at 1249–50. 
44 See id. at 1251–52, 1301. 
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have a significant enough stake to ensure that change occurs.45  
Therefore, although class actions present an opportunity to alter 
the behavior of corporations with equitable remedies, because of 
structural and financial motives they have ceased to be the 
quintessential embodiment of public law litigation.  That is, 
typical class action lawsuits are no longer about enforcing 
absolute rules of society; rather, they resemble transaction costs, 
or instances where businesses may pay a fee for breaking rules.46 
II.  SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS:  A PROD 
A.  Recent Trends and Reasons for Pursuing Shareholder 
Proposals 
Conventional wisdom considers shareholders as either the 
owners of the firm or the principals in a relationship in which 
managers serve as their agents.  In fact, the obligation to manage 
and establish policy for the firm is held by the board of 
directors.47  The mechanisms through which shareholders 
influence actual managerial decisions are few indeed. 48  They 
vote annually to elect directors (usually from a slate, proposed by 
existing members of the board, that includes the same number of 
nominees as there are vacancies), must vote to approve changes 
in the bylaws or in the charter (usually proposed in the first 
instance by the board), and vote on  extraordinary matters such 
as mergers, major sales of assets, or dissolution (again, proposed 
by the board). 
One area where shareholders have more ability to originate 
action is in the area of shareholders proposals.  These are simply 
resolutions put forward by shareholders for collective 
consideration.  They can relate to either issues of corporate 
strategy or of political or social issues more generally.  An 
example of the former type is a proposal to limit the corporation’s 
use of poison pills; an example of the latter is a proposal to 
explore the company’s history of equality in employment.  The 
federal government oversees a regulatory regime that seeks to 
ensure that proper proposals are included in materials circulated 
 
45 Id. at 1252. 
46 Id. at 1251–52. 
47 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2005). 
48 See DAVID P. TWOMEY ET AL., ANDERSON’S BUSINESS LAW & THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 941 (14th ed. 2001). 
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to shareholders in preparation for annual meetings.  Even 
though only few proposals receive a majority vote from 
shareholders, many shareholder activists nevertheless use them 
to raise issues in the public eye, with other shareholders, or with 
firm managers.  This section discusses the influence of proposals 
in affecting corporate behavior, especially with regard to 
employment discrimination. 
There is presently a growing trend of shareholder activism 
on a variety of issues, particularly environmental causes and 
corporate governance.  Shareholders also campaign to alter 
business practices in countries linked to international terrorism, 
to improve working conditions in foreign factories, and to curb 
the marketing of tobacco to youngsters abroad.49  Shareholder 
resolutions to curb employment discrimination provide a vivid 
example of the growing trend of shareholder activism.  According 
to Meg Voorhes, Director of the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center’s Social Issues Service, in 1999, only one proposal for 
changing an employment nondiscrimination policy related to 
sexual orientation went before shareholders and it received 8 
percent of the vote.”50  2000 and 2001 saw little change, as only 
one proposal was brought each year.51  As the campaign around 
Cracker Barrel gained traction in 2002, however, five proposals 
reached shareholders and they garnered an average of twenty-
two percent of the vote.52 
Institutional investors that care to influence corporate 
behavior through shareholder proposals can have particular 
impact, because they own sufficient shares to demand attention 
from corporations’ decisionmakers.  According to one executive of 
a socially-responsible investment firm, “The advantage of having 
an institutional holder file these resolutions is that companies 
always return their phone calls.  If they want a dialogue, they get 
it.”53 
Beginning in the late 1990s, shareholder activists—
especially institutional investors—began to see the possibility 
that corporations could incur liabilities as a result of litigation 
 
49 Id. 
50 Michael S. Markowitz, Gay Rights; Shareholders’ Power Is the New Weapon in 
Fight for Workplace Equality, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4, 2004 at F10. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (quoting Shelley Alpern, Assistant Vice President at Trillium Asset 
Management). 
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and public relations damage due to widespread employment 
discrimination.54  Various activist groups, motivated by either 
religious convictions or progressive ideals, also began to mobilize 
to alter what they saw as socially undesirable behavior.  These 
groups were joined by leaders of large public pension funds.  
Together, these unified interests began using shareholder 
proposals to attempt to modify discriminatory corporate 
employment practices.  For example, Equality Project—a group 
of shareholder activist groups that includes Pride Foundation, 
Walden Asset Management, Trillium Asset Management, and 
ISIS Asset Management—succeeded in changing Wal-Mart’s 
equal employment opportunity policy to include sexual 
orientation and gender identity.55 
The example of Equality Project’s successful campaign to 
amend Wal-Mart’s employment opportunity policy, however, 
highlights not only the power of shareholder campaigns, but also 
the limitations of shareholder proposals.  Shareholder proposals 
were one aspect of a multi-pronged strategy, and it took a 
significant amount of time to bring about change.  Negotiations 
between Equality Project and Wal-Mart’s management lasted for 
two years, from September 2001 until June 2003, before a policy 
amendment was agreed upon.56  Therefore, the role of 
shareholder proposals, as illustrated by the efforts of Equality 
Project, is often to mount pressure, generate media attention, 
and build momentum behind a policy change. 
The case of Cracker Barrel provides another vivid example 
of:  (1) the eagerness of shareholders to invest years of time and 
extensive financial resources to change corporate behavior; (2) 
the potential of shareholder activism; and (3) the limitations of 
current methods. 
1.  Case Study:  Cracker Barrel 
The battle to alter Cracker Barrel’s formal, written 
 
54 See Maureen Minehan, Shareholders May Help Determine Employment 
Issues, HR MAGAZINE, Feb. 1998, at 160. 
55 See Lance Turner, Wal-Mart Changes Policy To Protect Gays, ARKANSAS BUS., 
July 7, 2003, at 10. Wal-Mart had approximately 1.3 million employees at the time 
of the announcement and said that the changes were effective immediately. Id. 
56 Id. At the time of the announcement, Wal-Mart, the number one retailer in 
the world with $246.53 billion in annual sales, became the forty-ninth company in 
the top fifty of the Fortune 500 to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation; 
ExxonMobil was still refusing to alter its policy. Id. 
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discrimination policy involved a high-profile boycott and 
negotiations between activists and management coupled with 
shareholder proposals.57  For over a decade—from 1991 to 2002—
these shareholder proposals and the concerted external campaign 
failed to alter the company’s policy or practices.58  During this 
time, Cracker Barrel’s parent company, publicly traded CRBL 
Group, Inc., enjoyed great financial success59 even as it became 
“the poster boy for corporate antigay bigotry.”60 
In 1991, Cracker Barrel issued a memo stating that people 
who did not demonstrate “normal heterosexual values” could not 
work for the company.61  At least eleven Cracker Barrel 
employees lost their jobs in the 1990s because of their sexual 
orientation, though the number may be as high as twenty.62  One 
of the dismissed employees, Cheryl Summerville, a backup cook 
at the Douglasville, Georgia Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, 
did not previously hide her orientation and her immediate 
supervisor did not want to dismiss her.63  Yet her district 
manager fired her, writing on her separation papers the reason 
for termination:  “Employee is gay.”64 
Because Georgia is one of the many states where Cracker 
Barrel operates that does not have a law preventing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the company’s policy 
and Cheryl Summerville’s firing were not illegal.  In her words, “I 
called the ACLU and they said there was nothing I could do at 
 
57 Jeremy Quittner, Cracker Barrel Buckles: The Family Restaurant’s Change of 
Heart Provides a Prime Example for Activists Committed To Reforming Other 
Antigay Corporations, THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 4, 2003, at 24. 
58 Id. 
59 In 2002, CBRL had approximately “50,000 employees in 41 states, [was] 
publicly traded on the NASDAQ and rank[ed] 704th in the Fortune 1000. For the 
fiscal year ending August 2, 2002, it had $92 million in net income, nearly a 90% 
increase over the $49 million in net income reported a year earlier. At the end of the 
calendar year its stock was trading at around $30 a share.”  Id. 
60 Id. This characterization of Cracker Barrel is attributed to Shelley Alpern, 
Assistant Vice President of Boston-based Trillium Asset Management Corporation, 
which specializes in socially responsible investing: “It is important the poster boy for 
corporate antigay bigotry has finally acknowledged that lesbians and gays are part 
of their own workforce and part of their customer base as well. . . . The importance of 
this cannot be underestimated in terms of the company’s ability to create a 
comfortable working environment for lesbian and gay employees.”  Id. (quoting 
Shelley Alpern, Assistant Vice President at Trillium Asset Management). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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all.”65 
For the next ten years, the New York City Employees’ 
Retirement System (NYCERS), one of five pension funds for New 
York City workers that together control 391,000 shares of stock 
in CBRL, Cracker Barrel’s parent company, sponsored 
shareholder proposals that would push Cracker Barrel to 
overhaul its employment policy through a proxy vote.66  The 
shareholder proposal was coupled with a nationwide, decade-long 
boycott by gays and lesbians.67  Outside the coordinated 
campaign of external pressure, several discrimination lawsuits 
were also filed, at least two of which attempted class-wide 
redress.68 
Finally, prior to the November 26, 2002 shareholders’ 
meeting, shareholders controlling fifty-eight percent of CBRL’s 
49.8 million outstanding shares voted by proxy to approve the 
proposal.69  While no vote was taken at the shareholders’ 
meeting, immediately afterward the board voted unanimously to 
add sexual orientation to its written nondiscrimination policy.70  
The decade-long campaign of shareholder action, letter writing, 
negotiations, and attempted economic damage is therefore 
illustrative of both the promise and problems of bringing about 
change through shareholder proposals alone. 
It bears repeating that the specific goal of recent shareholder 
proposals was to change official corporate policies.  Another 
limitation of this strategy, even if policies are changed, is that 
policy alterations may not have a direct impact on day-to-day 
functions.  The campaigns to mobilize shareholders to vote on a 
 
65 Id. (quoting Cheryl Summerville, a former Cracker Barrel employee). 
66 Id. “NYCERS owns 189,000 shares.” Id. 
67 In 2002, the Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”), a Washington, D.C.-based 
gay advocacy organization gave CBRL zero points out of a possible one hundred in 
its annual rating of company attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. HRC’s 
WorkNet scale assigns points based on several factors, such as whether a company 
provides domestic-partner benefits or has a written corporate policy that bans 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. According 
to HRC’s Education Director, Kim Mills, “[t]hey [Cracker Barrel] had no 
nondiscrimination policy, no gay and lesbian employees’ organization, no 
appropriate and respectful marketing to the gay and lesbian community.” Mills 
explained that “working actively against the shareholder resolutions [in past years] 
got them that zero.” Id. 
68 The NAACP attempted at least one class action lawsuit. Class action 
certification was denied in 2002. Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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proposed policy change, however, helped raise the issue of 
discrimination to management’s attention.  Also, once a policy is 
changed, it is possible that employees can later sue when a 
company policy is violated to their detriment.  In summation, the 
nudging effect that shareholders can have upon a company’s 
management is reflected in the title of this section:  shareholder 
proposals are a prod with which to push a corporation in a 
certain direction. 
B.  Obstacles to Passing a Shareholder Proposal 
Though shareholder proposals may prod corporations into 
action as they did in the Cracker Barrel case, there are a number 
of obstacles that shareholder activists face when they use 
shareholder proposals to create change.  First, the proper subject 
matter for shareholder proposals is limited by federal law.  The 
SEC prevented shareholder proposals from affecting employment 
policies in the 1990s, saying that employment policies were part 
of the normal course of business of a company and therefore in 
the domain of the board and management.71  That changed in 
1998 when the SEC reversed its “Cracker Barrel decision” and 
changed its rules to allow voting on shareholder proposals 
affecting employment policies.72  There are still issues, however, 
that are off limits to shareholder proposals—domestic partner 
benefits being one of them—since these issues are still considered 
to fall within the ambit of the ordinary course of business.73 
Second, there are requirements pertaining to the votes 
required to adopt a proposal.  For a shareholder meeting to be 
valid, a minimum number, or quorum, of shareholders, or 
authorized proxies, must be present.  Further, a shareholder 
resolution may need more than a simple majority of cast votes to 
pass.  For example, the corporate charter may require a 
supermajority of votes at the meeting or set some other minimum 
threshold of total shareholder participation for a resolution to 
pass.  Non-voting shareholders who are present at the meeting or 
abstentions may either be counted as votes for or against the 
measure depending on the company charter and bylaws. 
There is one scenario in which shareholder action may be 
 
71 See Minehan, supra note 54, at 160. 
72 Id. 
73 See Markowitz, supra note 50, at F10. 
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taken without a meeting.  A number of states have adopted the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act (“RMBCA”) provision 
that “[a]ction required or permitted by this Act to be taken at a 
shareholders’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the 
action is taken by all the shareholders entitled to vote on the 
action.”74  To pass, however, the resolution in this case would 
require delivery to the corporation of a written consent describing 
the action to be taken and signed by all the shareholders entitled 
to vote on the action.75 
C.  Limitations of Shareholder Proposals 
It has been asserted that majority shareholder resolutions 
can be ignored by directors since directors have the discretion—
some would say the obligation—to exercise independently their 
best business judgment in carrying out their fiduciary duty.76  
According to this line of reasoning, “[w]hile majority shareholder 
support for precatory proposals is an important consideration for 
directors, it should not be the only one that they take into 
account when making decisions as fiduciaries, which they are 
required to make in the best interest of the company and all 
shareholders as a whole.”77 
Even shareholder activists acknowledge that shareholder 
proposals would not get anywhere if not for a coordinated public 
relations effort.  Grant Lukenbill, Vice Chairman of the Equality 
Project, says resolutions are most effective as part of a 
“‘multifaceted approach.’  In truth, by the time a resolution comes 
up, the company has probably already been lobbied by gay and 
lesbian groups, by employee resource groups and has watched its 
competitors change their policies.”78 
 
74 REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.04(a) (2002). 
75 Id. 
76 See Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When 
Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 24 
(2004); see also Quittner, supra note 57 (noting that a proxy vote by shareholders is 
not legally binding and a company’s board is not required to follow such a vote). 
77 Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 76, at 24. In general, courts refrain from 
enjoining the action of directors unless there is proof of acting: (1) on an uninformed 
basis; (2) in bad faith; or (3) not in the best interest of the corporation. This principle 
is known as the “business judgment rule.” TWOMEY ET AL., supra note 48, at 945. In 
keeping with this rule, courts do not interfere with a board’s discretion unless illegal 
conduct or fraud harms the rights of creditors, shareholders, or the corporation. See 
id. at 942. 
78 Markowitz, supra note 50, at F10 (quoting Grant Lukenbill, vice chairman of 
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Resolutions have been withdrawn without a vote when a 
company agrees to make a change.  For example, CSX stated that 
it started to revise its code of ethics even before the New York 
City Comptroller filed a resolution.79  When a resolution in favor 
of equal employment opportunity for gays and lesbians was filed 
at J.C. Penny, the board decided to back it in the company’s 
proxy statement; the measure drew ninety-three percent 
support.80  Other companies institute changes while insisting 
they are merely clarifying policies that were already in place.81  
Even Cracker Barrel, which at one point issued a memorandum 
stating that only heterosexual men and women were to be 
retained as employees, declared that its inclusion of sexual 
orientation in their antidiscrimination policy was simply a 
clarification of its existing policy.82 
A separate issue from the passage of formal policy changes is 
whether the reality in the workplace has changed.  This is one 
reason that the Human Rights Campaign maintains an annual 
report card on workplace conditions.83  The fact that shareholder 
activists have prodded aerospace giant Lockheed Martin to take 
steps that dramatically improved its score is evidence that these 
efforts are potentially producing results beyond mere policy 
changes.84  Also, while a change in formal policy may have no 
direct impact on ongoing and future day-to-day decisions, it does 
give potential future plaintiffs grounds for a lawsuit. 
To summarize, shareholder proposals have in fact succeeded 
in changing corporate behavior in various ways over the past 
decade, even though they only rarely receive more than a small 
percentage of the actual vote.  They are most effective when they 
 
the Equality Project, which promotes gay and lesbian shareholder initiatives). 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Quittner, supra note 57 (noting that Cracker Barrel claimed it had 
“‘always had a strong written policy that prohibits discrimination of any kind in the 
workplace’” even though it had previously issued a memo stating people who did not 
demonstrate “normal heterosexual values” could not work for the company) (quoting 
Julie Davis, spokeswoman for Cracker Barrel). 
83 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX ON GAY, 
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2004), available 
at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Miscellaneous/Ratingsindexes/ 
HRCCorporateEqualityIndexUSA (follow Corporate Equality Index 2004 hyperlink) 
(stating that the intent of the Index is to be a “road map to equal treatment for 
GLBT Americans in the workplace and marketplace”). 
84 See Markowitz, supra note 50, at F10. 
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are coupled with other forms of pressure.  When successful, they 
can potentially contribute to a change not only in formal policy 
but in the daily practice of firms. 
III.  ULTRA VIRES:  A BIG STICK 
A.  Evidence That Ultra Vires Lives85 
The incorporation statutes of forty-nine states allow these 
states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra 
vires activities—that is, activities outside of the corporation’s 
authority.86  Even critics of the ultra vires doctrine acknowledge 
that these provisions of states’ incorporation laws are based “on 
the notion that the state had an interest in deterring [ultra vires] 
activity by virtue of its responsibility to protect the public 
welfare.”87 
While the requirement of listing specific corporate purposes 
and powers was removed from state incorporation laws, the 
requirement that the corporation’s purposes and activities be 
“lawful” or “legal” was never removed.88  The Model Business 
Corporation Act states that the articles of incorporation shall set 
forth “[t]he purpose or purposes for which the corporation is 
organized which may be stated to be, or to include, the 
transaction of any or all lawful business for which corporations 
may be incorporated under this Act.”89  The Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act establishes that “[e]very corporation 
incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any 
lawful business.”90 
The first section of the Delaware statute establishes that “[a] 
corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter 
to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”91  The 
New York incorporation statute allows that “[a] corporation may 
 
85 For a more comprehensive review of the history of the ultra vires doctrine, see 
Kent Greenfield, Ultra vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1279, 1302–23 (2001). 
86 See Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State 
Interest in Ultra vires Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 85 n.9 (1983). 
The one exception is North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-08 (2001). 
87 Schaeftler, supra note 86, at 85. 
88 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 3.6, at 3.15 (1st ed. 1995). 
89 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 54(c) (1969). 
90 REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (1999). 
91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2001). 
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be formed under this chapter for any lawful business purpose.”92  
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have some kind of 
language in their incorporation statutes limiting corporations to 
lawful purposes and activities.93 
It is important to clarify that illegal activities constituted 
one variety of ultra vires activity during the doctrine’s glory days 
in the 1800s and early 1900s and since then have never been 
rationalized as permissible as a matter of corporate law, even 
when profitable.  Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations explains the traditional notion this way:  “[A]n 
illegal act or contract, defined as one expressly prohibited by the 
charter or a general statute, or which is immoral or against 
public policy, is ultra vires and also something more.”94  “If an act 
or contract is illegal, . . . it is doubtless ultra vires in the broad 
 
92 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2003). 
93 See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-3.01 (LexisNexis 1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.005 
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-301 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-103 (2001); 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 206 (Deering 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-103-101 (2004); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-645 (WEST 1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-301.04 (LexisNexis 
2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0301 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-301 (2003); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-41 (LexisNexis 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-301 
(1999); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.05 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-1 
(West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.1 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6001 (1995); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.3-010 (LexisNexis 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:22 
(1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, § 201 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 2-101 (LexisNexis 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 156, § 6 (LexisNexis 1996); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.1251 (LexisNexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-3.01 
(2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.386 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-114 (2003); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2024 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.030 (LexisNexis 2004); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:3.01 (LexisNexis 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-1 
(West 2003); N.M. STAT. § 53-11-3 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3-01 (2003); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.03 (LexisNexis 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18, § 1005 (West 
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.074 (2003); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (West 1995); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-3 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-101 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 47-2-3 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-13-101 (2002); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE 
ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10A-301 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 
13.1-626 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.03.010 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
180.0301 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-301 (2005). The only three states 
that do not have such language are Minnesota, North Dakota, and Vermont. See 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.101 (West 2004) (“A corporation may be incorporated 
under this chapter for any business purpose or purposes . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
10-19.1-08 (2001) (“A corporation may be incorporated under this chapter for any 
business purpose or purposes . . . .”). Vermont does not have such statutory 
language. It has specific purposes listed, but the general purposes section—Title 11, 
§41—was repealed in 1971. VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11, § 41 (repealed 1971). 
94 7A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3400, at 10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1997) (footnote omitted). 
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sense as being ‘without power.’”95 
Courts have held that illegal acts are indeed ultra vires.  For 
example, in Roth v. Robertson,96 the New York Supreme Court 
held the corporate directors of an amusement park personally 
liable for “hush money” paid in exchange for assurances that a 
law prohibiting the operation of their business on Sundays would 
not be enforced.  The payments were “something more than an 
ultra vires transaction, it was one bad in morals, and so evidently 
so that the plea that the payment was made for the supposed 
interest of the corporation cannot be deemed any excuse in 
law.”97  The court recognized the difference between acts that are 
simply ultra vires but not unlawful and acts that are both.  In the 
context of illegal ultra vires acts, the court stated that corporate 
directors would be required to refund damages to the corporation 
arising from such an act, even if the shareholder plaintiff had 
acquiesced in the act.98  Since then, no one has seriously argued 
that companies should be authorized in their charter to commit 
illegal acts.  In fact, even proposed limitations to the ultra vires 
doctrine proposed during the doctrine’s decline still explicitly 
prohibited acts “repugnant to law.”99 
Perhaps the best evidence of the continued relevance of ultra 
vires are companies’ own articles of incorporation.  Even a 
contractarian, who believes in a paradigm whereby companies 
are nothing more than a “nexus of contracts,” will see that, in 
drafting their charters, companies have accepted a binding 
commitment to engage in only legal activities.  For example, 
Unocal’s articles of incorporation state that the “purpose of the 
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a 
 
95 Id. at 12. In the context of contracts, the status of illegal contracts is clearly 
settled: “Contracts that are illegal are certainly ultra vires.” Eckhart v. Heier, 162 
N.W. 150, 151 (S.D. 1917). 
96 64 Misc. 343, 345, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1909). 
97 Id. at 343, 118 N.Y.S. at 353. 
98 See id. at 345–46, 118 N.Y.S. at 353. 
99 Robert S. Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the 
Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 YALE L.J. 297, 321 (1927). The relevant section reads as 
follows: 
I.  A corporation which has been formed under this Act, or a corporation of a 
class which might be formed under this Act, shall have the capacity to act 
possessed by an unincorporated association of natural persons. 
II.  The authority of such a corporation to act shall be limited to the 
performance of those acts which are necessary or proper for the 
accomplishment of its purposes and which are not repugnant to law. 
Id. 
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corporation may be organized” under California law.100  Nike, Inc. 
states in its charter that its purpose is “to engage in any lawful 
activity for which corporations may be organized” under Oregon 
law.101  Ford Motor Company’s articles of incorporation list a 
variety of business purposes that the company may engage in, 
including the manufacture and sale of automobiles.  The articles 
also state that the company is empowered “[t]o do everything 
necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishment of any 
purpose . . . hereinbefore set forth,” and additionally “to do every 
other act or thing incidental or appurtenant to or growing out of 
or connected with the aforesaid business or purposes, objects or 
powers, . . . provided the same be not inconsistent with the laws 
under which the corporation is organized.”102  General Electric’s 
charter states that the corporation’s purposes include “any 
activity which may promote the interests of the corporation, or 
enhance the value of its property, to the fullest extent permitted 
by law, and in furtherance of the foregoing purposes to exercise 
all powers now or hereafter granted or permitted by law.”103  
Philip Morris is incorporated “to transact any lawful business.”104 
 
100 Union Oil Co. of Cal., Restated Articles of Incorporation, art. II (June 29, 
1994). 
101 Nike, Inc., Restated Articles of Incorporation, art. III (Sept. 23, 2005). 
102 Ford Motor Co., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. III, § 13 (Aug. 2, 
2000). 
103 Gen. Electric Co., Certificate of Incorporation, § 2D (Apr. 27, 2000). 
104 Philip Morris Cos. Inc., Restated Articles of Incorporation, art. II (Mar. 18, 
1997). In addition, Sears, Roebuck & Company’s charter states that the purposes of 
the corporation are, inter alia, “[t]o engage in any activity which may promote the 
interests of the Corporation, or enhance the value of its property, to the fullest 
extent permitted by law.” Sears, Roebuck & Co., Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation, art. II, § 2.2 (May 13, 1996). Moreover, Boeing’s charter states that 
“[t]he nature of the business, or objects or purposes to be transacted, promoted, or 
carried on, are those necessary to engage in any lawful act or activity for which 
corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of 
Delaware.” The Boeing Co., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. III (Aug. 14, 
1997). IBM’s certificate of incorporation explains that the purpose of the corporation 
“is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized” 
under New York law. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., Certificate of Incorporation, art. II 
(Apr. 28, 1999). Raytheon Company states in its charter that “[t]he purpose of the 
Corporation shall be to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations 
may be organized and incorporated under the General Corporation Law of the State 
of Delaware.” Raytheon Co., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. III (May 5, 
2005). Columbia Hunter Capital Corporation is organized “to engage in any lawful 
act or activity for which corporations may be organized” under Delaware law. 
Columbia Hunter Capital Corp., Certificate of Incorporation, art. III (Oct. 19, 2000). 
Sprint Corporation “is organized for profit, and the purpose for which it is formed is 
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B.  Reasons for Pursuing an Ultra Vires Lawsuit 
There are several advantages to choosing an ultra vires suit 
to influence corporate behavior.  First, there is no ambiguous 
standard or difficult threshold to hurdle, such as certifying a 
class action lawsuit or rallying a minimum number of 
shareholders to support a shareholder proposal.  A single 
shareholder owning a few shares of a company may sue to enjoin 
an activity.105 
Second, there are fewer unforeseeable contingencies and 
fewer evidentiary burdens than in a class action litigation; since 
there is a lower risk of failure and lower costs associated with the 
initial stages of the suit, a relatively smaller financial 
commitment is required.  Therefore, the main questions for the 
plaintiff shareholder’s attorney are whether there is sufficient 
evidence to prove that the company is engaging in illegal activity 
and what equitable remedies should be requested from the court. 
Third, the remedies allowed for in all states except North 
Dakota are either equitable relief (including injunctions) or the 
dissolution of the company.106  In other words, in its most 
extreme theoretical application, a violation of the ultra vires 
doctrine would empower courts to impose a “death sentence” on 
corporations that, for example, were engaging in ongoing and 
severe violations of law.  On a more moderate level of application, 
a court could be asked to enjoin the illegal conduct107 or to 
exercise its powers in equity and order the company to achieve 
certain benchmarks or engage in certain remedial or 
preventative programs to prevent further illegalities.  As the 
ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance state in section 2.01:  
“[T]he corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [i]s obliged, 
to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the 
 
to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized” 
under Kansas law. Sprint Corp., Articles of Incorporation, art. II (Apr. 28, 2000). 
Nabisco states that its purpose “is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which 
corporations may be organized” under Delaware law. Nabisco Group Holdings Corp., 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. III (June 16, 1999). 
105 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 343 (1855); see infra note 107. 
106 See Greenfield, supra note 85, at 1359. 
107 See, e.g., Hoole v. Great W. Ry., 3 L.R.-Ch. 262, 266-67 (Ch. App. 1867) 
(holding that an individual shareholder can bring suit to enjoin an ultra vires act); 
Beman v. Rufford, 61 Eng. Rep. 212, 218 (V.C. 1851) (holding that non-assenting 
shareholders can sue even when the majority of shareholders ratified the act). 
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boundaries set by law.”108  The comment to that section clarifies 
that “[t]he appropriate vehicle to remedy an alleged violation of 
the principles stated in § 2.01 would be an action for injunctive or 
other equitable relief by a shareholder.”109  As the United States 
Supreme Court has ruled, “beyond the limits of the act of 
incorporation, the will of the majority cannot make an act valid; 
and the powers of a court of equity may be put in motion at the 
instance of a single shareholder.”110  The power to order a 
company to change a pattern of behavior is one advantage that 
an ultra vires suit offers in comparison to a shareholder proposal 
to change policy. 
Unlike a typical shareholders’ derivative suit, no showing 
would have to be made that a demand was made to directors to 
act or that such a request would be obviously fruitless.111  Unlike 
a shareholder suit seeking to hold directors accountable for 
breaching a duty of care, no showing of a financial loss to the 
company would be required.112  Unlike a derivative case 
attempting to recover damages from directors, the proof that 
some monitoring system was in place would not absolve the 
directors from liability.113 
C.  Obstacles To Winning an Ultra Vires Suit 
The two obstacles to success in an ultra vires lawsuit would 
be producing evidence that a company is presently engaging in 
unlawful conduct and then convincing the judge to use the court’s 
powers in equity to enforce the relevant law by requiring action 
or the cessation of action by the company.  Significantly, the 
profitability or lack of profitability of an illegal act is irrelevant 
and therefore does not represent an obstacle of any kind. 
In the context of employment discrimination, class action 
 
108 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1) (1992). 
109 Id. § 2.01 cmt. j. 
110 Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 343. 
111 See generally Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 644 N.Y.S.2d 
121 (1996) (detailing the universal demand approach and the demand/futility 
approach). 
112 See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1974) (denying a motion to 
dismiss on the ground of plaintiffs’ sufficient allegation of actual corporate loss). 
113 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (noting that the burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking to hold directors liable is 
quite high when evidence of a reporting system exists). 
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lawsuits have demonstrated that it is possible to meet the 
threshold requirement of aggregated evidence of discrimination, 
even when human resources management is decentralized.114  
Statistics about under-representative composition of upper 
corporate management are well known and suggest that similar 
patterns of discrimination could be proven at many corporations.  
For example, a 2002 survey found that 82% of the director 
positions on Fortune 1000 companies were held by white men, 
11% by white women, 3% by African Americans, 2% by Asian 
Americans, and 2% by Hispanics. 
In general, both labor law violations and illegal 
discrimination are under-reported to government watchdogs.  For 
example, the U.S. Department of Labor, charged with 
enforcement of child labor, wage, and hour provisions of federal 
labor law, cited only 104 cases of child labor violations in fiscal 
year 1998, even though an estimated one million child labor 
violations occur in U.S. agriculture every year.115  While the lack 
of perfect information on employment law violations is an 
obstacle to bringing an ultra vires suit, facts such as these may 
be seen instead as indicative of an opportunity.  Groups of 
shareholders and institutional investors116 are increasingly eager 
to wield their power to influence corporate behavior.  The 
activism of shareholders coupled with a powerful, unused 
doctrinal tool in the face of unchecked legal violations should 
logically result in multiple opportunities and contexts in which to 
prove that the ultra vires doctrine can truly impact corporate 
behavior to the benefit of all stakeholders.  Even shareholders 
not concerned with the ethics of a pressured company would 
arguably benefit in the long run when their company ceases or 
avoids conduct that could lead to fines or tort claims in the 
future. 
D.  Limitations of Using Ultra Vires 
The key limitation to the ultra vires doctrine is that it will 
 
114 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145, 150, 160 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
115 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001: UNITED STATES: HUMAN 
RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/usa/#labor. 
Compounding the problem, “penalties were typically too weak to discourage 
employers from using illegal child labor.” Id. 
116 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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work only when a corporation is violating a law in a jurisdiction 
where it is engaged in a business activity.  Once that is 
established, however, an ultra vires suit can be brought in the 
state where the company is incorporated to enforce, in effect, the 
law of the jurisdiction where the lawbreaking is occurring.117  For 
example, Nevada has a state law banning employment 
discrimination in both the public and private sectors.  Therefore, 
a single shareholder with proof of discriminatory treatment of 
homosexuals by Wal-Mart in Nevada could sue in a Delaware 
court (where Wal-Mart is chartered) and ask for equitable relief 
of the situation.  The key limitation of the other evaluated 
methods—namely, the difficulty or impossibility of bringing 
about actual change in corporate conduct—should be less of a 
problem in the context of an ultra vires lawsuit because equitable 
relief is, by the nature of the claim, the focus of the remedy.118 
CONCLUSION 
Studying attempts to alter corporate behavior in the context 
of employment discrimination over the past decade yields several 
key insights that activists and shareholders can learn from and 
can apply to other contexts. 
First, class actions are increasingly difficult to have certified 
by a court due to the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision that 
adequacy of representation must be rigorously scrutinized.  
Furthermore, while class actions have historically held the 
promise of equitable relief—that is, the possibility to win a court 
order that a company take concrete steps to achieve specific 
future goals—that outcome is no longer frequently pursued nor 
achieved.  There is also evidence that even on an individual level, 
plaintiffs may recover more monetary compensation with an 
individual action.  Finally, even very large settlements do not 
impact the bottom line sufficiently to affect share prices at either 
the time of the lawsuit’s filing or at the time of settlement.  
Therefore, class actions during the past decade of 
antidiscrimination activism appear to be limited in both their 
theoretical ability to deter undesirable behavior and in their 
practical ability to lead a company in a certain direction. 
 
117 Cf. Greenfield, supra note 85, at 1372 (stressing that the ultra vires doctrine 
renders an illegal corporate act unlawful in any jurisdiction, not simply where the 
company is incorporated). 
118 See supra Part I.C. 
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Second, shareholder proposals are an increasingly frequent 
means for shareholder activists to prod corporate policy in a 
certain direction.  While it is still not easy to mobilize a campaign 
on such a large scale, at least SEC regulations now allow 
proposals that affect areas that were previously in the exclusive 
purview of directors.  The problem with shareholder proposals is 
that while they may succeed in changing formal policy, a 
shareholder proposal is inherently incapable of mandating 
specific enforceable goals or activities. 
As the case of Cracker Barrel illustrates, shareholder 
proposals and lawsuits, supplemented by strategies from outside 
the realm of corporate law such as boycotts and coordinated 
negative publicity, have together managed to change policies at 
some large recalcitrant companies.  On the other hand, these 
struggles have taken a decade of concerted, focused effort to 
achieve results, and it remains an open question whether the 
formal policy alterations that have been implemented will result 
in actual changes in the day-to-day conduct of these corporations. 
Therefore, class action lawsuits are like a bridle:  conceivably 
useful to lead a corporation in a specific direction through the use 
of equitable remedies, but they are unwieldy.  Shareholder 
actions are like a prod for nudging a corporation in a vague 
direction, but that nudging will not necessarily result in 
predictable, specific steps. 
While no one likes to beat a recalcitrant animal, in situations 
where a corporation engages in an ongoing, undeterred pattern of 
illegal conduct, it is good to know that there is also a  stick in the 
tool shed.  It is important to emphasize once again that ultra 
vires suits can be initiated by either states’ attorneys general or 
shareholders.  This Article has analyzed the ultra vires doctrine 
from the perspective of shareholder activists rather than the 
perspective of state law enforcement.  Unlike a shareholders’ 
derivative action, no proof of loss of profitability is needed to win 
at trial.  Just evidence of ongoing illegal acts should be enough to 
win a judgment. 
As discussed, the dissolution of the company is one available 
remedy, albeit an extreme and unlikely outcome.  Given the 
choice, when confronted with a persistent pattern of illegal 
conduct, a court will be more likely to order—and the company 
more likely to accept—a remedy in equity.  A basic tenet of 
equitable relief is that a court can tailor a remedy to a situation, 
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require that specific steps be taken, provide mechanisms for 
measuring outcomes, and enforce ongoing accountability to the 
court. 
Obviously, many questions about the pursuit of an ultra 
vires lawsuit cannot be answered with complete certainty until a 
case is filed.  Courts have dealt with questions surrounding the 
mechanics and implementation of various doctrines for centuries 
on a case-by-case basis, however, and a revival of the ultra vires 
doctrine will prove to be no exception. 
 
